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Abstract In a series of recent works, Kit Fine (The Journal of Philosophy, 100(12),
605–631, 2003, 2007) has sketched a novel solution to Frege’s puzzle. Radically
departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that Frege’s puzzle forces us to reject
compositionality. In this paper we first provide an explicit formalization of the rela-
tional semantics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, by Fine. We
then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate, forcing Fine
to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this enrichment, we argue,
that that the semantics is compositional. We then examine the deep consequences
of this result for Fine’s proposed solution to Frege’s puzzle. We argue that Fine has
mis-diagnosed his own solution–his attempted solution does not deny compositional-
ity. The correct characterization of Fine’s solution fits him more comfortably among
familiar solutions to the puzzle.
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1 Introduction
In a series of recent works, Fine [7, 8] has sketched a novel solution to Frege’s puzzle.
The novelty is itself surprising and exciting given the minimal resources with which
the puzzle is posed. Frege [9] claimed that sentences differing by the substitution of
coreferential proper names such as (1) and (2) differ semantically, arguing that (2)
expresses a valuable extension of our knowledge, while (1) doesn’t.
(1) Cicero is Cicero.
(2) Cicero is Tully.
The difference shows up in more complex sentences as well: attitude ascriptions
differing by the substitution of one name for the other may even have different truth-
values.
(3) Sam believes that Cicero is Cicero.
(4) Sam believes that Cicero is Tully.
Assuming that the meaning of a name is its referent, this would entail that the mem-
bers of each pair semantically differ even though they differ only by the substitution
of synonymous terms. This conflicts with the principle that meaning is composi-
tional. Focussing on the simple sentences, the conflict can be brought out as a tension
between the following claims:
DIFFERENCE: (1) and (2) differ semantically.
COMPOSITIONALITY: If sentences (1) and (2) differ only by the substitution of
constituents which are semantically the same, then (1) and (2) are semantically
the same.
MINIMAL PAIR: Sentences (1) and (2) differ only by the substitution of ‘Cicero’
for ‘Tully’—all other inputs to semantic evaluation coincide.
SYNONYMY: ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ are semantically the same.
The typical menu of solutions either outright rejects DIFFERENCE (e.g., [24, 28]) or
posits that the meaning of a name goes beyond its referent, thereby rejecting SYN-
ONYMY (e.g., [2, 9]). In the case of attitude ascriptions, it is also popular to reject
that (3) and (4) are a MINIMAL PAIR (e.g. [3] and [27]).
Radically departing from previous solutions, Fine argues that the culprit is
COMPOSITIONALITY.
Current philosophical thinking on Frege’s puzzles has reached an impasse, with
strong theoretical arguments in favor of [DIFFERENCE] and strong intuitive
arguments in favor of [SYNONYMY] and yet no apparent way to choose between
them. And this suggests that we should perhaps take more seriously the possi-
bility of rejecting the assumption of [COMPOSITIONALITY] that puts them in
conflict. ([8]: 35)
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COMPOSITIONALITY is a deep seated assumption and guiding principle in semantic
theorizing, but Fine argues that its rejection is mandatory on account of a puzzle
paralleling Frege’s, which Fine dubs the antinomy of the variable. The puzzle is that
open sentences (5) and (6) differ semantically, even though—Fine alleges—‘x’ and
‘y’ are semantically the same.
(5) Rxx
(6) Rxy
Specifically, (5) and (6) embed differently: ∃x∃yRxx may be false while ∃x∃y Rxy
is true. The puzzle is then structurally similar to our original puzzle.
DIFFERENCE: (5) and (6) differ semantically.
COMPOSITIONALITY: If formulae (5) and (6) differ only by the substitution of
constituents which are semantically the same, then (5) and (6) are semantically
the same.
MINIMAL PAIR: Formulae (5) and (6) differ only by the substitution of ‘x’ for
‘y’—all other inputs to semantic evaluation coincide.
SYNONYMY: ‘x’ and ‘y’ are semantically the same.
The synonymy claim is motivated by Fine’s suggestion that the difference between
‘x’ and ‘y’ is merely “notational”, and thus their semantic roles should be the same:
“It is not as if the variables ‘x’ and ‘y’ have a special ‘x’-sense or ‘y’-sense” ([8]:
38).1
According to Fine, the only reasonable solution to this parallel puzzle is to deny
COMPOSITIONALITY.
We must allow that any two variables will be semantically the same, even
though pairs of identical and of distinct variables are semantically different;
and we should, in general, be open to the possibility that the meaning of the
expressions of a language is to be given in terms of their semantic relationships
to one another. ([8]: 24)
Fine roughly outlines a non-compositional semantics for first-order logic incorporat-
ing the following principle.
RELATIONISM: The truth conditions of a sentence are not determined by the
semantic features of its constituents in isolation, but instead determined by the
1The antinomy of the variable and the claim of SYNONYMY is admittedly subtle. It won’t matter for our
project here whether or not SYNONYMY is well-motivated, what matters is how Fine solves the apparent
antinomy, and what lessons he draws about Frege’s puzzle. Ultimately, we think the best—perhaps only—
way to make sense of the antinomy is in terms of structured meanings (or at least in terms of some
fine-grained notion of meaning), whereby if two syntactically isomorphic sentences are synonymous (e.g.
∀xFx and ∀yFy ), then they must have corresponding constituents which are synonymous. Given this it
follows that ‘x’ and ‘y’ must be synonymous. See [18] for a detailed discussion the antinomy framed in
these terms and a resolution of the problem within a broadly Tarskian framework.
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semantic relationships that hold among the sequence of its constituents as a
whole.
The relationist semantics for variables is meant to create space for a similar rejection
of COMPOSITIONALITY in the case of proper names. Fine’s proposed solution has
taken its place among the rival solutions to Frege’s puzzle. Proponents and critics
have focussed on the extension of the relationist semantics to names (see, e.g. [5, 25,
29], and [20]).
But we are skeptical about the underlying semantics for variables. Even granting
that the antinomy is a real puzzle—that ‘x’ and ‘y’ agree semantically—we deny that
Fine’s approach, on its own terms, mandates the rejection of COMPOSITIONALITY
for variables. Specifically, the relationist semantics on its own is inadequate. In order
to repair it, Fine introduces additional complications: he enriches the input to the
semantics.
ENRICHED REPRESENTATION: The input to semantics must be enriched with
patterns of coordination between occurrences of variables. We can think if
these patterns of coordination “as lines connecting one occurrence of the vari-
able to another—as in the familiar ‘telegraphic’ notation for quantifier binding”
([8]:30).2
The incorporation of an additional input, a coordination scheme, is often taken to
be a critical component of Fine’s non-compositional, relationist semantics. We will
argue, however, that RELATIONISM and ENRICHED REPRESENTATION are actu-
ally in conflict: positing the latter makes the former unnecessary. By enriching
the input to semantics, Rxx and Rxy are no longer a minimal pair, differing
only by the substitution of variables ‘x’ and ‘y’. Therefore there is no threat to
COMPOSITIONALITY.
In the following, we first provide an explicit formalization of the relational seman-
tics for first-order logic suggested, but only briefly sketched, in ([7]: 623-629; [8]:
25-32). We then show why the relational semantics alone is technically inadequate,
forcing Fine to enrich the syntax with a coordination schema. Given this enrichment,
we argue that the semantics is (weakly) compositional. We then examine the deep
consequences of this result for Fine’s proposed solution to Frege’s puzzle. Fine’s
solution to the puzzle can only be properly assessed when we appreciate which of
the inconsistent claims he rejects. Specifically, in the case of Frege’s puzzle, Fine
also relies on coordination schema as extra inputs to the semantics. Thus, Fine’s
solution is not to deny COMPOSITIONALITY but instead to deny that (1) and (2) are
MINIMAL PAIRS differing only by the substitution of co-referential proper names.
Therefore, Fine has mis-diagnosed his own solution. The correct characterization of
Fine’s solution fits him more comfortably among familiar solutions to the puzzle.
2Fine is alluding to ([22, 23]: 69-70) who suggested that relations of variable binding be represented using
“quantificational diagrams”, where lines or “bonds” connect quantifiers to the positions in predicates that
they bind. This idea was echoed in ([12]: 244), who connects it to Frege’s syntax whereby “variables”
(i.e. German letters) are merely typographic parts of the quantifier sign serving to link the concavity to the
relevant “gaps” in predicates.
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2 Relationism
Fine’s RELATIONISM denies compositionality. Expressions α and β may agree
semantically, though composite expressions φα and φβ differing only by the sub-
stitution of an occurrence of α for and occurrence of β semantically differ. The
relationship between α and the other components of φα may generate semantic
effects different from the relationship between β and the other components of φβ .
To implement this idea, Fine proposes to evaluate a composite expression in terms of
the semantic connection on the sequence of expressions composing it. The semantic
connection on a sequence of expressions is the sequence of values that those expres-
sions are capable of jointly assuming (in that order). The sequence corresponding
to φα may contain multiple occurrences of α, which are semantically mandated to
assume the same value. The sequence which results from substituting an occurrence
of α for β may have a different semantic connection, since an occurrence of α may
not be required to assume the same value as an occurrence of β.
To handle the semantics of first-order logic, Fine considers the semantic con-
nection on a sequence of variables. This generalizes the notion of a domain for a
variable. The domain D of a single variable is the set of values that it can assume.
The “domain” of a pair of variables 〈x, y〉 is the set of sequences of values that the
variables are simultaneously capable of assuming: {〈d1, d2〉 | d1, d2 ∈ D}. The idea
generalizes to any sequence of simple expressions: the “domain” of a sequence of
simple expressions is the set of sequences of values that the expressions are simulta-
neously capable of assuming. Defining the semantic connection on any sequence of
simple expressions of the language provides the “lexical” or base semantics in terms
of which the semantic connections on complex expressions is defined. The semantic
connection on any complex expression is defined in terms of the semantic connection
on its syntactic constituents when taken in sequence.
The idea is to define what values (true or false) the sentence ‘x + y = y + x’
may assume in terms of what values the expressions composing the sequence
〈x,+, y,=, y,+, x〉 may assume when taken in that sequence. The sequence
〈x,+, y,=, y,+, x〉 may assume the value 〈7,+, 3,=, 3,+, 7〉, but not the value
〈7,+, 3,=, 2,+, 2〉. Given a definition of ‘+’ and ‘=’ in conjunction with the seman-
tic connection on its simple constituents would yield that ‘x + y = y + x’ can only
assume the value truth. In this way one can recursively define the truth (and falsity)
conditions of sentences in terms the generalized notion of a “domain” (i.e. in terms
of semantic connections).
Notice that the semantic connection on the pairs 〈x, y〉 and 〈x, x〉 are distinct—
{〈d1, d2〉 | d1, d2 ∈ D} and {〈d, d〉 | d ∈ D}, respectively—even though the semantic
connection on ‘x’ and ‘y‘ themselves are the same. Thus the semantic connections
on the pairs of variables are not grounded in the semantic connections on their mem-
bers. Fine claims that this rejection of COMPOSITIONALITY is the key to solving the
antinomy:
[The relational semantics] embodies a solution to the antinomy: the intrinsic
semantic features of x and y (as given by the degenerate semantic connections
on those variables) are the same, though the intrinsic semantic features of the
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pairs x, y and x, x (again, as given by the semantic connections on those pairs)
are different. ([8]: 31-2)
In the next section, we formally implement Fine’s relationist idea that the seman-
tic features of a composite expression should be evaluated in terms of semantic
connections on their component expressions taken in sequence.
2.1 The Semantics
Assume the syntax is standard. For any sequence of variables α1, . . . , αn drawn from
{xi}i∈N and any n-place predicate πn ∈ {Fni }i,n∈N the well-formed sentences of the
language are provided by the following grammar:3
φ = πnα1 . . . αn | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | ∀αφ
As usual the other connectives, such as →,∨, ∃, etc., be introduced as abbreviations,
if desired.
Let a model A = 〈D, I 〉, where D is a (non-empty) domain of individuals, and
I is an interpretation for the predicates, which assigns sets of ordered n-tuples of
individuals to the n-place predicates. And let {0, 1} be the set of truth-values. The
semantics will not require relativization to an assignment of values to variables (in
the style of [30]), since the semantic connection on a formula is defined in part in
terms of the semantic connection on its variables taken in sequence, and the base
clause of the semantics specifies the semantic connection on any sequence of vari-
ables. In order to streamline the exposition we’ll introduce a convention concerning
concatenation of sequences.
Definition For sequences σ = 〈a1, . . . , ai〉 and τ = 〈b1, . . . , bj 〉 such that i, j ≥ 1,
let (σ, τ ) = 〈a1, . . . , ai, b1, . . . , bj 〉.
This operation requires a few typographical remarks.
Remark 1 We omit brackets on 1-membered sequences, so if a is not a
sequence, we abbreviate (σ, a) = (σ, 〈a〉).
Remark 2 The operation (. . . , . . .) is associative, so we abbreviate (σ, τ, υ) =
(σ, (τ, υ)) = ((σ, τ ), υ).
Remark 3: When occurring inside denotation brackets we will omit the round
brackets so for example σ, τ = (σ, τ ).
3We provide the formation rules using a version of the convenient Backus-Naur notation. The interpre-
tation is clear, but for purists note that we use α, πn, and φ for metavariables instead of defining, say,
〈variable〉, 〈n-place predicate〉, and 〈sentence〉.
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As we have said, Fine semantically evaluates an expression in terms of the
semantic connection, ., on its constituents taken in sequence, where the semantic
connection is the sequence of values they are capable of jointly assuming. The com-
plex expression is said to “give way to” the sequence of its constituents expressions
whose semantic connection determines the possible values of the complex expres-
sion. In order to recursively implement this idea, one must define the contribution of
an expression χ of arbitrary complexity to the semantic connection on a sequence
(
, χ,ϒ) that contains χ . A formula will be true (relative to a model A) when the
sequence consisting of just that formula assumes only the value 1 (and false when it
only assumes the value 0). That is, for all formulae φ and models A:
TRUTH: φ is true (in A) iff φ = {1}
FALSITY: φ is false (in A) iff φ = {0}
With these definitions in place we provide the following recursive specification of
the semantic connection on a sequence including a formula (relative to a model A) in
terms of the semantic connection on the sequence of expressions it gives way to. The
base clause specifies the semantic connection on any sequence of variables:
VARIABLES: α1, . . . , αn =
{〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ Dn | di = dj if αi = αj
}
Since formulae can assume only the values 0 and 1 (and open formulae can assume
both values), the semantic connection on a sequence containing a formula contains
only the following sequences of values:
ATOMIC:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ 
,πα1 . . . αk, ϒ iff for some τ such that (σ, τ, υ) ∈

,α1, . . . , αk, ϒ, τ ∈ I (π)
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ 
,πα1 . . . αk, ϒ iff for some τ such that (σ, τ, υ) ∈

,α1, . . . , αk, ϒ, τ /∈ I (π)
NEGATION:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ 
,¬φ,ϒ iff (σ, 0, υ) ∈ 
,φ,ϒ
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ 
,¬φ,ϒ iff (σ, 1, υ) ∈ 
,φ,ϒ
CONJUNCTION:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ 
, (φ ∧ ψ),ϒ iff (σ, 1, 1, υ) ∈ 
,φ,ψ,ϒ
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ 
, (φ ∧ ψ),ϒ iff (σ,m, n, υ) ∈ 
,φ,ψ,ϒ, where
m = 0 or n = 0
QUANTIFICATION:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ 
,∀αφ,ϒ iff (σ, d, 1, υ) ∈ 
,α, φ,ϒ, for all d ∈ D
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ 
,∀αφ,ϒ iff (σ, d, 0, υ) ∈ 
,α, φ,ϒ, for some
d ∈ D
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Thus we’ve defined the semantic connection on any formula in terms of the semantic
connection on its syntactic constituents when taken in sequence (relative to a model
A). For example, a formula such as ∀x(Fx ∧ Gx) can be semantically evaluated as
follows.
1 ∈ ∀x(Fx ∧ Gx) iff (d, 1) ∈ x, (Fx ∧ Gx), for all d ∈ D
iff (d, 1, 1) ∈ x, Fx,Gx, for all d ∈ D
iff for some a such that (d, a, 1) ∈ x, x,Gx,
a ∈ I (F ), for all d ∈ D
iff for some a and some b such that (d, a, b) ∈ x, x, x,
a ∈ I (F ) and b ∈ I (G), for all d ∈ D
iff for all d ∈ D, d ∈ I (F ) and d ∈ I (G)( since x, x, x
= {(e, e, e) | e ∈ D})
A similar derivation would show that 0 ∈ ∀x(Fx ∧ Gx) just in case for some
d ∈ D either d /∈ I (F ) or d /∈ I (G). It can easily be proved that relative to a model,
∀x(Fx ∧ Gx) = {1} or ∀x(Fx ∧ Gx) = {0}. Thus, the formula is either true or
false, as will be any closed formula.
2.2 Relationism and Compositionality
The semantics thus presented seems to deliver the results Fine desires. Excepting an
issue to be discussed in the next section, the semantics appears to deliver the right
truth conditions for formulae of first-order logic. Moreover, the semantic interpreta-
tion of a variable will be the semantic connection on the variable itself, thus x =
y. Yet, the semantic connection on Rxy and Rxx may differ, since x, y = x, x.
As Fine ([8]: 26) notes the semantic value of a composite expression is not a func-
tion of the semantic values of its constituents (either immediate or terminal) and the
mode of combination of these values. Therefore, his semantics denies COMPOSI-
TIONALITY and its usual generalizations as strong or weak compositionality. Let μ
be the syntactic mode of combination. Then, strong and weak compositionality can
be formulated as follows (cf. the definitions in [16]):
STRONG COMPOSITIONALITY: If φ = μ(φ1, . . . , φn) and ψ = μ(ψ1, . . . , ψn)
and if φi and ψi are semantically the same for all i (that is, φi = ψi), then φ
and ψ are semantically the same.
WEAK COMPOSITIONALITY: If φ = μ(φ1, . . . , φn) and ψ = μ(ψ1, . . . , ψn)
where each φi and ψi is a terminal syntactic constituent and if φi and ψi
are semantically the same for all i (that is, φi = ψi), then φ and ψ are
semantically the same.
The relational semantics above is not even weakly compositional because complex
expressions are semantically different even though they differ only by substituting
terminal syntactic constituents which are semantically the same. In fact, Fine only
secures a significantly weaker principle.
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RELATIONAL DEPENDENCE: If φ = μ(φ1, . . . , φn) and ψ = μ(ψ1, . . . , ψm) and
if the sequences of expressions φ1, . . . , φn and ψ1, . . . , ψm are semantically the
same (that is, φ1, . . . , φn = ψ1, . . . , ψm), then φ and ψ are semantically the
same
The semantic evaluation of a complex expression will be a function of the semantic
values of its complex expressions plus relations among the expressions themselves
rather than their values.
In semantics the principle of compositionality is often taken as both a guid-
ing methodological hypothesis and a theoretical posit (see [17]). The explanatory
motivation stems from considerations of semantic productivity. A language user
can semantically evaluate infinitely many novel complex expressions, because the
meanings of the complex expressions are a function of the semantic values of their
constituents. It is an open question whether the weaker relationist principle can fill
the explanatory role of the compositionality principles. Fine can explain why a lan-
guage user can understand a complex expression in terms of that language user’s
knowledge of the semantic connection on the sequence of simpler expressions that
compose the complex expression. But the language user’s knowledge of this seman-
tic connection does not arise from her understanding of the semantic features of the
simple expressions in the sequence. Explanation comes to an end at a language user’s
knowledge of a semantic connection on a sequence of expressions.
3 Enriched Representation
RELATIONISM alone introduces semantic ills, which are far worse than the antimony
itself. In particular, it mandates that every occurrence of the same variable type co-
varies. Fine mentions that free occurrence of a variable will be forced to assume
the same values as bound occurrences of the same variable. Consider the sentence
∃xFx ∧ Gx. In this sentence, the quantifier ‘∃x’ has scope over the formula Fx but
not over Gx. Thus, ‘x’ as it occurs in Gx is free. Yet, on the semantics developed
so far, the free occurrence is coordinated with the bound occurrence. Specifically,
∃xFx ∧ Gx is true just in case for some (d, d, d) ∈ x, x, x, d ∈ I (F ) and d ∈
I (G). Thus, the sentence will be true just in case there exists something which is
both F and G. As a result, the sentence has the same truth conditions as ∃x(Fx ∧
Gx). As ([8]: 31) observes, this is the familiar “dynamic” reading of the sentence
∃xFx∧Gx—for example, in dynamic predicate logic where an existential quantifier
can have binding effects beyond its syntactic scope [10]. As such, this might not be
viewed as disaster, but rather as Fine suggests “a great virtue of the approach” (ibid.:
31).
But more troubling results follow. For instance, it is far less plausible to say that
∀xFx ∧ Gx ever has the same truth conditions as ∀x(Fx ∧ Gx). The most telling
difficulty, not discussed by Fine, is that multiple occurrences of a variable bound by
distinct quantifiers in a formula such as ∃xFx ∧∃x¬Fx will be forced to assume the
same values. Normally, one would want ∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬Fx to be true just in case there
is an entity which is F and a (distinct) entity which is not F . But on the semantics
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so far, ∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬Fx will have the same truth conditions as the logical falsehood
∃x(Fx ∧ ¬Fx), which says that there exists a single entity which is both F and not
F . The derivation runs as follows:
1 ∈ ∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬Fx iff (1, 1) ∈ ∃xFx, ∃x¬Fx
iff (d1, 1, 1) ∈ x, Fx, ∃x¬Fx, for some d1 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, 1) ∈ x, x, ∃x¬Fx, d2 ∈ I (F ),
for some d1, d2 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, d3, 1) ∈ x, x, x,¬Fx, d2 ∈ I (F ),
for some d1, d2, d3 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, d3, 0) ∈ x, x, x, Fx, d2 ∈ I (F ),
for some d1, d2, d3 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, d3, d4) ∈ x, x, x, x, d2 ∈ I (F ) and
d4 /∈ I (F ), for some d1, d2, d3, d4 ∈ D
iff for some d ∈ D, d ∈ I (F ) and d /∈ I (F )
( since x, x, x, x = {(e, e, e, e) | e ∈ D}).
Thus, the formula (∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬Fx) cannot assume the value true.
There is no way to count this result as a virtue. Fine needs be able to differentiate
the contributions of distinct occurrences of the same variable. To do so, Fine intro-
duces additional semantic inputs: a coordination relation among variables, which
one could represent with linking “wires” as follows:
The coordination relations restrict which occurrences of the same variable type must
be co-interpreted in the semantic connection.
The change here is monumental. The relational semantics, as developed in the
previous section, effectively reads the coordination off of the “logical structure” of
the sentence. A variable’s two-fold occurrence in a sequence dictated that the cor-
responding positions in the semantic connection on the sequence take coordinated
values. This allowed for the possibility that a minimal pair such as Rxx and Rxy,
differing only in the substitution of an occurrence of ‘x’ for ‘y’, may differ semanti-
cally. The substitution of ‘x’ for ‘y’ does not preserve the overall logical structure of
the sentence.
However, the suggestion now is that we impose a coordination scheme as an extra
input to semantic evaluation. The immediate result is that Rxx and Rxy do not—
in themselves—differ semantically. A difference only arises when we evaluate Rxx
in conjunction with a coordination scheme c which associates the two occurrence of
‘x’.4 ([7]: 628) conceives of the coordination scheme as syntactic in nature, not a
semantic parameter: “the syntactic object of evaluation will no longer be a sequence
of expressions but a coordinated sequence of expressions”. Thus, the syntactic input
4This point is also pressed by Hovda ([11]: 506).
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to semantic evaluation is enriched. Our implementation in the semantics below, how-
ever, will be neutral as to whether the coordination schema is an addition to the
syntactic structure (or more generally the linguistic representation), or as a seman-
tic parameter against which the sentence is processed. (This is partially with an eye
towards Frege’s puzzle where it is less plausible to introduce a syntactic coordination
relation among distinct occurrences of the same name.)
3.1 Coordination
Since we are no longer semantically evaluating a formula or sequence of expressions
alone, but only in conjunction with a coordination schema, we need to supplement
the semantics. Again, one might take this coordination schema as an additional syn-
tactic input, a syntactic relation among occurrences of a given expression. Or, one
might take the coordination schema as a semantic input against which a formula is
processed. Our approach will leave the coordination schema unanalyzed; we are only
investigating the logical properties it must have. To do so, we represent the semantic
connection on a sequence of expressions α1, . . . , αn relative to a coordination scheme
c as α1, . . . , αnc. The coordination scheme c itself is meant to determine a relation
among occurrences of expressions in a formula or sequence of formulas.
Formally, a coordination scheme is an equivalence relation on the free occur-
rences of variables in the sequence, subject to the requirement that it only relate
occurrences of the same variable. ([8]: 30)
The occurrences of an expression in a sequence can be associated with their
numerical positions in the sequence. So formally, an equivalence relation on occur-
rences in an n-membered sequence α1, . . . αn of expressions can be modeled as an
equivalence relation c on the numbers in {1, ..., n}. For the purposes of the semantics
of variables, Fine himself imposes the additional requirement that c(i, j) holds only
if αi = αj . The motivation seems to be that it should be impossible for ‘∃y’ to bind
the occurrence of ‘x’ in ∃yFx, though once coordination is introduced, we don’t see
a principled reason why this binding should be prohibited.5
5Fine suggests that the syntactic object of evaluation will not be a formula, but a pair consisting of a
formula and a coordination schema which relates occurrences of the same variable. So construed, ‘Fxx’
under schema c = {< 1, 1 >,< 1, 2 >,< 2, 1 >,< 2, 2 >} is a proper input to semantic evaluation
whereas ‘Fxy’ under schema c is not (in other words ‘Fxy’ with a wire linking ‘x’ and ‘y’ is simply ill-
formed). But once the coordination schema are introduced sameness and distinctness of variables becomes
redundant—one might as well just have /the variable/ or gaps. Many theories that make use of “wire
diagrams” or coordination schema, in fact, simply dispense with having variables at all. As we see it
either binding is enforced by wire diagram (i.e. coordination) or it is enforced by sameness of variable
(i.e. co-indexing). Thus, we implement the semantics in a way that allows genuine coordination between
distinct variables. This implementation is also motivated by looking forward to Fine’s treatment of names,
where Fine is explicit that distinct expressions such as names and anaphoric pronouns can be genuinely
coordinated. Thanks to Kyle Hammet Blumberg and Harvey Lederman for pressing us to clarify this subtle
issue.
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With this terminology in place, the semantics basically follows the semantics
above.
VARIABLES:α1, . . . , αnc =
{〈d1, . . . , dn〉 ∈ Dn | di =dj iff c(ij)
}
ATOMIC:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ 
,πα1 . . . αk, ϒc iff for some τ such that (σ, τ, υ) ∈

,α1, . . . , αk, ϒ
c, τ ∈ I (π)
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ 
,πα1 . . . αk, ϒc iff for some τ such that (σ, τ, υ) ∈

,α1, . . . , αk, ϒ
c, τ /∈ I (π)
NEGATION:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ 
,¬φ,ϒc iff (σ, 0, υ) ∈ 
,φ,ϒc
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ 
,¬φ,ϒc iff (σ, 1, υ) ∈ 
,φ,ϒc
CONJUNCTION:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ 
, (φ ∧ ψ),ϒc iff (σ, 1, 1, υ) ∈ 
,φ,ψ,ϒc
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ 
, (φ ∧ ψ),ϒc iff (σ,m, n, υ) ∈ 
,φ,ψ,ϒc, where
m = 0 or n = 0
QUANTIFICATION:
• (σ, 1, υ) ∈ 
,∀αφ,ϒc iff (σ, d, 1, υ) ∈ 
,α, φ,ϒc, for all d ∈
D
• (σ, 0, υ) ∈ 
,∀αφ,ϒc iff (σ, d, 0, υ) ∈ 
,α, φ,ϒc, for some
d ∈ D
As we have observed, the core difference here lies in the semantic connections
on sequences of variables. Whereas the simple relationist semantics coordinates
any two occurrences of ‘x’ in a sequence, the supplemented semantics coordinates
occurrences of ‘x’ only if they are related by the coordination relation.
The semantics repairs the problem with the formula ∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬Fx. On its own,
no occurrences of ‘x’ in the formula are coordinated. Thus, neither occurrence of the
quantifier ‘∃x’ binds any variables in its scope, making the (uncoordinated) formula
equivalent to ∃xFy∧∃z¬Fw. However, the formula can also be enriched with a coor-
dination scheme that relates occurrences of the variable ‘x’. The desired coordination
scheme is as above:
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The coordination scheme c then relates the first and second occurrences of ‘x’ and
the third and forth occurrences of ‘x’.6 The derivation showing that ∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬Fx
cannot be true is now blocked:
1 ∈ ∃xFx ∧ ∃x¬Fxc iff (1, 1) ∈ ∃xFx, ∃x¬Fxc
iff (d1, 1, 1) ∈ x, Fx, ∃x¬Fxc, for some d1 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, 1) ∈ x, x, ∃x¬Fxc, d2 ∈ I (F ),
for some d1, d2 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, d3, 1) ∈ x, x, x,¬Fxc, d2 ∈ I (F ),
for some d1, d2, d3 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, d3, 0) ∈ x, x, x, Fxc, d2 ∈ I (F ),
for some d1, d2, d3 ∈ D
iff (d1, d2, d3, d4) ∈ x, x, x, xc, d2 ∈ I (F ) and
d4 /∈ I (F ), for some d1, d2, d3, d4 ∈ D
Since coordination places the restriction that c(1, 2) and c(3, 4) the base clause
yields that
x, x, x, xc = {〈d1, d2, d3, d4〉 | d1 = d2 ∧ d3 = d4
}
= {(d1, d1, d2, d2) | d1, d2 ∈ D
}
and thus we can conclude that the formula is true
iff for some d1, d2 ∈ D, d ∈ I (F ) and d2 /∈ I (F ).
Thus, the sentence is true relative to the relevant coordinate scheme just in case
there exists an object which is F and a (possibly distinct) object which is not F ,
which conforms to its meaning in more pedestrian semantics for first-order logic.
4 Compositionality revisited
Where does this leave the antinomy? Recall that the puzzle was that (5) and (6)
semantically differ, even though they are minimal pairs differing only by the substi-
tution of synonyms ‘x’ and ‘y’. The relationist solution to the puzzle conceded all of
this, but denied COMPOSTIONALITY, the principle that if formulae (5) and (6) differ
only by the substitution of constituents which are semantically the same, then (5) and
(6) are semantically the same.
But, as we have observed, the formulae Rxx and Rxy no longer differ in them-
selves, but differ only when supplemented with a coordination scheme c relating
the occurrences of ‘x’ in Rxx. This coordination scheme may be an additional
6Formally, c = {〈1, 1〉, 〈1, 2〉, 〈2, 1〉, 〈2, 2〉, 〈3, 3〉, 〈3, 4〉, 〈4, 3〉, 〈4, 4〉}.
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component of the syntax or a parameter against which the formula is evaluated. Thus,
Fine effectively denies that (5) and (6) differ semantically insofar as they are minimal
pairs.
However, once supplemented with a coordination scheme c relating occurrences
of ‘x’ in Rxx, there is a semantic difference. But the semantic difference does not
occur between minimal pairs. That is, (5) differs from (6) both by substituting an
occurrence of ‘x’ for ‘y’ and by having a distinct coordination scheme. We have to
distinguish between ‘Rxx’ in which the occurrences of x are coordinated from ‘Rxx’
in which the occurrences are not coordinated:
The formula on the right does, while the formula left does not, form a minimal
pair with Rxy.7
Thus, by invoking ENRICHED REPRESENTATION Fine does not solve the antinomy
by denying COMPOSITIONALITY, but only by denying that the formulae, insofar as
they differ semantically, are MINIMAL PAIRS. Indeed, the semantics given above
is weakly compositional on a standard construal. Weak compositionality generally
demands that if expressions φ and ψ differ in meaning relative to index i, then either
φ and ψ differ in structure or there are corresponding subordinate expressions φ1 and
ψ1 that differ in meaning relative to i. Treating the coordination schema as an index
yields the following principle of weak compositionality:
WEAK COMPOSITIONALITY (WITH COORDINATION): If φ = μ(φ1, . . . , φn)
and ψ = μ(ψ1, . . . , ψn) where each φi and ψi is a terminal syntactic constituent
and if φi and ψi are semantically the same for all i with respect to c (that is, φic
= ψic or I (φi) = I (ψi)), then φ and ψ are semantically the same with respect
to c. (That is: φc = ψc.)
The difference between the semantics enriched with coordination schema and
the mere relational semantics is this. In the relational semantics, two formulae such
as Rxx and Rxy give way to the sequence of variables (x, x) and (x, y), respec-
tively, where the semantic connections on these sequences are automatically different
even though the semantic connections on the variables taken individually are the
same. In the enriched semantics, however, the semantic connections on the sequences
(x, x) and (x, y) are the same, given the same coordination scheme as input. It is
only when different coordination schema are taken as input that the sequences dif-
fer semantically. As a consequence, weak compositionality is restored: the only way
for two structurally isomorphic sentences φ and ψ to differ semantically relative to
a coordination scheme is if the sequence of variables that each gives way to dif-
fers semantically relative to the coordination scheme (or for their other vocabulary to
different semantically).
7If we instead implement coordination as a parameter, we must distinguish between evaluating Rxx
against a scheme c which does not related the two occurrences of ‘x’ and a scheme c∗ that does. If Rxx is
evaluated at c, then it forms a minimal pair with Rxy. But if it is evaluated at c∗, then the two formulas to
not constitute a minimal pair, differing only by the substitution of occurrences variables x for y.
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Thus, the semantics of variables on offer provides no motivation for denying weak
compositionality, and Fine’s solution to the antinomy of the variable is best under-
stood as rejecting MINIMAL PAIR. Thus, relationism becomes an idle wheel in Fine’s
solution to the antinomy. The formulae Rxx and Rxy differ in meaning only when
they are evaluated against distinct coordination schema. The semantic connection on
the sequences x, x and x, y plays no role in generating this difference, except inso-
far as these sequences are themselves evaluated against distinct schema. In the next
section, we examine what lessons can be drawn for Frege’s puzzle.
5 Relationism and Frege’s Puzzle
Fine’s solution to Frege’s puzzle takes its cue from his solution to the antinomy of
the variable. We have seen two conflicting aspects to Fine’s solution to the antinomy
of the variable. One aspect is RELATIONISM, the semantic value of a complex is
determined not merely by the meanings of its constituents but by relations among
the constituents when taken in sequence. RELATIONISM, thus formulated, is a denial
of even weak compositionality. But—in the case of variables—we saw that RELA-
TIONISM does not generate a satisfactory semantics. To repair the semantics, Fine
introduces the other aspect, ENRICHED REPRESENTATION. The input to the semantic
processing of a sentence is enriched so that Rxx and Rxy no longer form a minimal
pair. But, introducing ENRICHED REPRESENTATION restores compositionality and
thereby undermines the case for RELATIONISM.
Fine’s solution to Frege’s puzzle, likewise vacillates between both these aspects.
He explicitly advertises his solution to Frege’s puzzle as a rejection of COMPOSI-
TIONALITY ([8]: §2.B). On this view, even though the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’
agree in meaning (and occupy terminal nodes), the sentences (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’
and (2) ‘Cicero is Tully’ do not agree in meaning. The explanation of this fact
is meant to issue from RELATIONISM. Fine rejects the following principle: “If the
pairs of names ‘Cicero’, ‘Cicero’ and ‘Cicero’, ‘Tully’ are semantically different
then so are the names ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully”’ ([8]: 39). The semantics for sentences
(1) and (2) will be evaluated in terms of these sequences just as—in the rela-
tionist semantics for variables—the semantics of Rxx and Rxy are evaluated in
terms of the sequences (x, x) and (x, y), respectively. But, as was the case with
variables, Fine finds reason to reject the view that coordination among the seman-
tic values of two occurrences of a name in a sentence arises solely from the fact
that the name occurs twice in the sentence. Rather, Fine’s semantics for names
introduces coordination schema as extra inputs to the semantic evaluation. There-
fore, his approach really should be taken as a denial of the claim that ‘Cicero
is Cicero’ and ‘Cicero is Tully’ constitute a minimal pair. In particular, they dif-
fer because they are assessed with respect to different parameters. We begin by
sketching how coordination among the semantic values of names in the content
of a sentence might be construed. We then examine why these coordination rela-
tions are generated by ENRICHED REPRESENTATION rather than RELATIONISM.
This better situates Fine’s solution within the space of existing solutions to Frege’s
puzzle.
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5.1 Coordination Among Names
Fine wants to explain the difference between (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and (2) ‘Cicero
is Tully’ by appealing to the fact that the names may be coordinated in the pair
(‘Cicero’, ‘Cicero’) but not in the pair (‘Cicero’, ‘Tully’). The coordination of the
variables in the pair (x, x) was accounted for by the the fact that the pair can only
assume values of the form 〈a, a〉. On the other hand, the lack of coordination between
the variables in the pair (x, y) was accounted for by the fact that the pair can assume
a value 〈a, b〉, where a = b. The resources of the relationist semantics for variables,
however, will need to be supplemented to account for proper names. A name ‘Cicero’
or ‘Tully’ is capable of assuming only one value: namely, its referent. So we cannot
account for the difference between the pair (‘Cicero’, ‘Cicero’) and the pair (‘Cicero’,
‘Tully’) merely by assessing the different semantic connections, if this is construed
as the set of sequences of values which the expressions can jointly assume.8 Rather,
we need to enrich the semantic connections to include additional information about
coordination.
Fine develops his theory in the context of the assumption that the semantic content
of a sentence is structured and that an occurrence of a name in the sentence corre-
sponds to the occurrence of the semantic value of the name in the structured content.
The particular implementation of this assumption is flexible.9 As Fine ([8]: 54) says:
“All that matters is that we should be able to talk meaningfully of the occurrences
of an individual in a proposition and that we should be able to talk meaningfully of
substituting one individual for another within a given proposition.” The connection
between two occurrences of a name will be represented by an additional connection
between the values of the occurrences of the value of name in the semantic value of
the sentence.
We may think of the content of a sentence in this richer sense as a structured
meaning. The sentence is construed as a whole composed of occurrences of vari-
ous subordinated expressions and the content of the sentence is construed as a whole
composed of occurrences of their values. Without representing coordination, the sen-
tences (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and (2) ‘Cicero is Tully’ will have the same structured
meanings since Cicero = Tully:
8That is, unless names themselves are treated as variables (cf. [6] and [4]).
9In fact, one could even implement coordination schema in a more or less “unstructured” possible worlds
framework. What matters is that relative to different coordination schema ‘Cicero is Cicero’ may be asso-
ciated with different semantic values. Thus, semantic values would need to be construed not as mere sets
of possible worlds, but instead as worlds paired with coordination information (e.g. tags and/or anchors of
some sort). For example, the multi-centered worlds approach of [15] might be construed as a view along
these lines.
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In order to represent that these are coordinated, lines will be drawn between the
relevant occurrences of Cicero and Tully in the structured meanings.
Appealing to structured meanings provides the resources to describe the difference
between the contents of (1) and (2). Now we need a semantic theory to explain why
these sentences have these different contents. We turn to this issue in the next section.
5.2 The Semantics of Coordination
As we have mentioned, Fine advertises his semantic solution to Frege’s puzzle as
an implementation of the apparatus of semantic relationism. The semantic difference
between (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and (2) ‘Cicero is Tully’ is meant to arise because
to the semantic difference between the pairs ‘Cicero’, ‘Cicero’ and ‘Cicero’, ‘Tully’
without there being a difference in the semantics of the individual names.
A semantic difference between the identity sentences only strictly implies
a semantic difference between the pairs of names “Cicero”, “Cicero” and
“Cicero”, “Tully” but we may deny that the semantic difference between the
pairs of names need imply a semantic difference between the names them-
selves. . . . “Cicero” is strictly coreferential with “Cicero” but that “Cicero” is
only accidentally (not strictly) coreferential with “Tully”. ([8]: 51)
This type of view closely resembles a proposal in [21] and [13]. As Putnam
described the view, a necessary condition for synonymy is intensional isomor-
phism (cf. [1]) which is equivalent to sameness of structured meaning. But Putnam
argued that synonymy requires more than sameness of structured meaning. Rather,
synonymy also requires agreement in logical structure ([21]: 118), where “[t]wo sen-
tences are said to have the same logical structure, when occurrences of the same sign
in one correspond to occurrences of the same sign in the other” (ibid.: footnote 8).
Although (1) and (2) result from synonymous expressions put together in the same
way, they nonetheless differ in logical structure, since ‘Cicero’ occurs twice in (1)
but only once in (2).10
10[21] insists that “. . . ‘Greek’ and ‘Hellene’ are synonymous. But ‘All Greeks are Greeks‘ and ‘All Greeks
are Hellenes’ do not feel quite like synonyms. But what has changed? Did we not obtain the second
sentence from the first by ‘putting equals for equals’? The answer is that the logical structure has changed.
The first sentence has the form ‘All F are F ’, while the second has the form ‘All F are G’” ([21]: 118).
Kaplan in a similar vein states, “I have come to think that two sentences whose syntax—perhaps here
I should say, whose logical syntax—differs as much as ‘a = a’ differs from ‘a = b’ should never be
regarded as having the same semantic value (expressing the same proposition), regardless of the semantic
values of the individual lexical items ‘a’ and ‘b’” ([13]: 95, footnote 6).
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Implementing this view in our framework, ‘Cicero is Cicero’ will correspond to a
structured meaning in which the nodes corresponding to the occurrence of ‘Cicero’
are linked while ‘Cicero is Tully’ will correspond to a structured meaning in which
the nodes are not linked.
So on this view, two nodes should be linked in the structured meaning of a sentence
just in case the corresponding positions are occupied by the same term.
A semantic theory that assigns structured meanings unadorned with linking rela-
tions to formulae is weakly compositional, any two sentences with the same structure
whose terminal nodes agree in meaning express the same unadorned structured
meaning. However, a theory that assigns structured meanings adorned with link-
ing relations to formulae may fail to be compositional. Two sentences that express
different adorned structured meanings may result from composing corresponding
expressions with the same semantic values in the same way. For it may assign distinct
structured meanings adorned with linking relations to ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and ‘Cicero
is Tully’, though these sentences agree in structure and their terminal constituents
have the same semantic values.
Putnam [21] and Kaplan [13], therefore, develop an account of what a relationist
solution to Frege’s puzzle would look like. But as with the case of variables, Fine ([8]:
41) rejects this solution. According to Fine coordination between two occurrences
of a name requires something more than mere recurrence of the name—just as coor-
dination between two occurrences of a variable requires something more than mere
recurrence of the variable. This, in turn, will serve as an additional input to semantic
processing.
According to Fine, the linking relation in ‘Cicero is Cicero’
. . . cannot be a matter of having the same typographic name on the left and
the right [. . . ] nor can it be a matter of having the same name with the same
reference on the left and the right[.] Nor can it consist in the names themselves
being the same. ([8]: 41)
The worries about mere typographic coincidence (or typographic coincidence with
accidental co-reference) being insufficient for coordination between to uses of names
are well-taken.
But Fine is explicit that the very same public language name may be used on two
occasions and fail to be coordinated. Fine considers ([14]) puzzling Peter who hears
the common language name ‘Paderewski’ on two different occasions, once when
presented with a musician and once when presented with a politician. Peter does not
realize that the same word is used to refer to the same man on both occasions. At
one point, Peter comes to ask ‘is Paderewski Paderewski?’. As ([8]: 111ff ) analyzes
the situation, Peter’s uses of the name ‘Paderewski’ are instances of the same public
Does semantic relationism solve Frege’s puzzle? 115
language word ‘Paderewski’. (Fine is explicit that they are coordinated with the same
public language expression.) That is, the same public language word recurs twice in
Peter’s question and its answer (7).
(7) Paderewski is Paderewski.
Yet, the two occurrences of the public language word ‘Paderewski’ in (7) can fail
to be coordinated. (So coordination is not Euclidean.)
What this means is that it cannot be a matter of the semantics of the public
language word ‘Paderewski’ that any two occurrences of it are coordinated. So it
cannot be a matter of semantics that (7) always expresses the coordinated structured
meaning:
Analogously, Fine should think that it is not a matter of semantics that the public
language sentence (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ always expresses a structured meaning in
which the occurrences of the name ‘Cicero’ are coordinated.
Nonetheless, ([8]: 108-114) insists that it is a semantic matter that certain uses of
the public language sentence (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ express a coordinated structured
meaning while certain uses of (2) ‘Cicero is Tully’ do not express a coordinated
structured meaning. But this means that coordination must come from something
other than recurrence of the public language names ‘Cicero’. Fine (ibid.: 89) denies
that “context” supplies the missing information. But regardless of where it comes
from it is an additional input to the semantic processing.
Whether an utterance of the public language sentence (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’
expresses a coordinated content is not a function of the meaning of the sequence of
public language expressions ‘Cicero’, ‘is’, ‘Cicero’ on its own. The meaning of an
utterance of (1) depends on whether or not the two occurrence of ‘Cicero’ are coordi-
nated. Fine tells a story about when coordination happens. In particular, the two uses
will be coordinated when a speaker takes them to be be coordinated.
When two tokens of a given name are uttered by a single speaker, they will be
coordinated if and only if they are internally linked [i.e. just in case the speaker
takes them to have the same use]. ([8]: 107)
So the meaning of a use of a public language sentence (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ is
a function of the meaning of the sequence of public language expressions ‘Cicero’,
‘is’, ‘Cicero’ and also of what the speaker takes to be coordinated with what. If the
speaker does not take the occurrence of the public language word to be coordinated,
then the sentence does not express a coordinated structured meaning.
But this means that insofar as (1) ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and (2) ‘Cicero is Tully’ differ
in meaning, they are not minimal pairs differing only by the substitution of proper
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names. They are evaluated against different coordination schema. To put the matter
differently, (1) is a minimal pair with (2), but also has the same meaning. On the other
hand, (1*) differs in meaning from (2), but these do not constitute a minimal pair.
(1) Cicero is Cicero.
(1*)
(2) Cicero is Tully.
Fine would likely deny that the origin of the coordination in (1*) is a “syntactic”
matter. Rather, it arises from whether speakers take the two occurrences to have the
same use. We would construe this as a difference in context.11 ([8]: 113) himself has
a narrower conception of context. But he nonetheless must concede that the input to
the semantic evaluation in (1*) and (2) differs by more than the mere substitution
of proper names. There is only a threat to compositionality if ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and
‘Cicero is Tully’ (under the intended readings) are MINIMAL PAIRS—all inputs to
semantic evaluation must coincide. But since the inputs to semantic evaluation differ
by coordination schema, they are not MINIMAL PAIRS.12 Thus, compositionality is
not threatened. Just as in the variable case, RELATIONISM is an idle wheel. What
explains the substitution failures is ENRICHED REPRESENTATION, the coordination
scheme, which is an extra element of the semantic evaluation. And, just as in the
variable case, introducing additional inputs to the semantic evaluation reintroduces
compositionality.
6 Conclusion
Frege’s puzzle, recall, is that the substitution of coreferential names does not seem
to preserve meaning. We have by and large restricted our attention to the substitution
of coreferential names in simple sentences such as (1) and (2). As we noted, the
same puzzle arises from the substitution to coreferential names in attitude ascriptions
such as (1) ‘Sam believes that Cicero is Cicero’ and (2) ‘Sam believes that Cicero is
Tully’. Construing Fine as denying MINIMAL PAIR situates his view among a larger
class of views that reject this component of the puzzle. For instance, hidden indexical
theories (e.g., [3] and [27]) would deny that insofar as they differ semantically, (1)
and (2) are minimal pairs differing only by the substitution of coreferential proper
11[19] develops and modifies Fine’s idea by positing four axioms governing a “semantic relation” between
occurrences of expressions, which he calls ‘primitive linking’. This relation is a “primitive relation from
the perspective of a semantic theory” (ibid.: 322), and thus, whether it is construed as a “contextual”
parameter or not, will feature as an additional input to semantics.
12Fine doesn’t explicitly discuss this issue with attention to the question of whether the inputs are “minimal
pairs”, and thus he doesn’t, of course, explicitly acknowledge the consequences that we’ve drawn using
our preferred terminology. Yet, even though it is an open question how Fine might respond, we think that
he is committed to our interpretation.
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names. According to the hidden indexical theory, the attitude ascriptions are also
assessed at different contexts, which leads to a difference in meaning. Fine differs
from the hidden indexical theory by locating the additional semantic input in the
simple sentence itself and not in an attitude ascription containing it.13 But no matter
how this additional semantic input is implemented to solve Frege’s puzzle, there is
no need to deny compositionality. As with the case of the antinomy of the variable,
Frege’s puzzle does not need to be taken as a threat to this basic tenet of semantic
theorizing.
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